Translated by Colonel H. C. Wylly, C.B., and published by permission.
I N their most recently-uttered remarks on Anglo-German relations and the purport of the journey of Lord Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, British Ministers have offered suggestions that the present breach, so painfully felt on either side, should be bridged by means of a systematic limitation of spheres of influence, and of existing and future possessions. These suggestions can only be understood as implying that a rearrangement of esisting colonial possessions is under consideration, and that those territories also must be considered which, at the present moment, arc neither English nor German.
There is at present, however, nothing to show what particular portions of the world's surface the British diplomatists have in their minds.
Is it believed in London that the troubles in
China will not tend to a consolidation or rejuvenation of the Chinese Empire, but rather that they will, or at. least may, lead to a partition in which w e are to share? Or is it in Africa, where it is to be assumed that a bargain has long been struck, in readiness for the-moment when the Portuguese will no longer be able to remain masters of their vast possessions? I know nothing about such matters; but when they are in the air it seems to me seasonable that German public opinion should seek to be clearly informed as to the goal for which we are aiming. W e need not trouble ourselves with petty matters. For such no Minister would make so special a journey to what might almost be described as the enemy's capital. But while I acclaim it with the utmost satisfaction, and hope that the negotiations thus commenced may attain their object of closing the breach once again between Germany and England, there must also be something great and important in tlie work which is being done and which must be carried through. I do not propose to draw up a programme, but merely to open a discussion on the various possibilities which may present themselves in the event of any real settlement being come to.
The point of view from which colonial policy tends primarily to be regarded is the commercial; markets, crops, investment of capital, the profits of undeveloped natural wealth. An appreciable number of German people must have the oppor-THE AIJIS OF GERMAN COLOSIAL POLICY [OCT., IgIZ tunity offered them of gaining a livelihood in the colonies, while their well-being will influence for good the wealth of the whole nation, and indirectly benefit the mass of the people by the provision of markets and work. This is all very true, but the essence of colonial policy is not thereby eshausted, and even the most important point of all is not touched, since all these purely commercial advantages can be enjoyed in the colonies of foreign nations, so long as these maintain the principle of " the open door." Instead, therefore, of sceliing to acquire colonies of our own, we might make it the object of our policy to secure the maintenance of the open door in colonies all the world over. Many a colonial politician has reckoned up the outlay on colonies to be far greater than the gain to be drawn from them; in which case one could do nothing better than to leave to other nations the burden of opening up and administering colonies, while we ourselves merely make use of them for purposes of trade and commerce.
I will not pause here to repeat the old statement that such'a calculation has many flaws ; the all-important point is that colonial policy must be dictated not merely by coi?tinerc~nl but rather by national interests.
Towards the end of the year 1893, the English historian, I-Iartpole Lecky, gave a lecture on the subject of " England and her Colonies," which appeared to us of such importance that we published a translationeof it by I. Imelmann, in the number of this Journal, dated February, 18s)q. Lecky pointed out that in England the Free Trade School, represented by such distinguished leaders as Cobden and Mill, had taught that thc cost of the colonies in pounds, shillings and pence, was far more than they brought in, and that England could hardly do better than to get rid of all her colonies, as qliiclily as possible, iri all parts of the world, whether in India, Australia, Africa, or Canada. But the sound good-sense of the English people, despite the fact that they had accepted the principles of the Free Trade School, did not for one moment permit them to be led astray by such false doctr,ines, and they not only insisted upon maintaining the place of the mother country at the head of 56 more or less self-governing dominions, but, as we all Iinow, she expanded still further at the cost of mighty wars. W h y ? Lecliy describes the size and splendour of the British World Empire, the expansion which English ways, speech, character, principle, has gained all the world over by means of British colonial policy, and closed his lecture with these great words :-" What the future position of these islands may be in the commonwealth of nations, no mortal man Gin predict. Hut what has been, has been, and I have had my hour."
IVhat has concerned and concerns England, concerns US too. The aim of our colonial policy is not merely the extension of German trade and commerce over the world, for trade and commerce'are only the means for the extension and the strengthening of the German nation. That trade follows the flag is not always right, says Lecky, but the heart always follows the flag.
The colonies we have up to now possessed give us only a very small prospect of ever aiming at such a goal ; their commercial value is not very high, and their value as a national asset is even lower. The first proviso for a colony which aspires to be an assistance to Germany, is the absolute supremacy in it of the German language. The German colonies are, as a rule, no more than mere enclosures, set in the midst of the huge compact mass of British possessions.
Whoever, therefore, speaks German is in Africa in much the same position as one who in Europe speaks Danish or Magyar, and a German, even often in our own colonies, finds himself obliged to learn English. This state of things constitutes a certain danger for our nation. The language exerts an influence upon modes of thought, customs and requirem:nts.
The most successful form of colonization is the peasant colony, which provides so compact a little nation that such dangers are not forthcoming, and the colony itself feels as though it were a . fragment of the mother country. We cannot count upon such a peasant colonization, for the simple reason that we no longer possess any peasant surplus. The whole tale of our oversea emigration has long since fallen to 20,000-30,000 per annum, while we annually employ in Germany upwards of a million of foreign workmen-Russians, Poles, Ruthenians, Italians and Scandinavians. Germany is no emigratory land, but rather a country to which others immigrate. The peasants and agricultural labourers who might colonize, are most urgently required at home, and we cannot permit them to go oversea. Those who should fill our colonies and stamp their impression upon them, are the higher classes, the thousands of the upper and middle class which our educational System produces, and for whom we in the fatherland have no satisfactory employment. Men about thirty years of age, 1~110 are in the flower of their manhood and have acquired all 'the necessary Itnowledge and skill for the fulfilment of a great sphere of utility, sit about idle or are VOL. LX'I. only casually employed i n Germany, and wait for a job with a poverty-striclien air. These we should send abroad as engineers, merchants, planters, doctors, overseers, officers and officials, in order that they might rule the great masses of the lojver peoples, as the English do the natives of India. It is, however, not enough to distribute these men of a higher class just here and there in a few large or small district's, since a really permanent and secure national gain is the result only of the acquirement of n large, self-contained territory, which the different districts help to espand, while they themselves are by it protected and held together. A really large, self-contained territory, uniformly administered, acquires a certain political consistence ; the uniform customs-district creates ties and interests which not only promote prosperity, but which are not easily destroyed.
R
Cities with a large white population and their parochial concerns need a very vast Hititerlaad. But such a colonial empire will be capable of closely attaching itself to the mother country, when at least certain portions of the territory are so constituted that not merely a fluctuating, but a firmly-founded, German race can control the aboriginal inhabitants and continue there to floarish.
On sucli a broad, territorial foundation it ought to be possible to develop a sentiment among the German planters and business men of the upper class, which niight well be described as a .German-African national pride.
Mere colonial enclaves can never produce anything. of this kind; they may possess or develop a greater or a lesser commercial value, but never a national future. For this a really vast and self-contained terri-, tory is required. For this reason among others I was always opposed to the acquirement of a new German eizclave in Southern RIarocco, and preferred the expansion of the Cameroons to that of the Congo.
A territory must now be searched for which will afford space not only for the colonization and activities of our disposable manhood, but which itself contains room enough wherein n permanently established German race can maintain itself by its own powers.
There are in Africa two great spheres in regard to which it is still doubtful whether they have been actually disposed of or not; these are the Portuguese possessions already mentioned, and the Belgian Congo. Opinions differ greatly whether these two small States are capable of maliing their positions good, and I do not venture to offer any views on the matter. In England men regard the J3elgian Congo with a very hostile glance, asserting that the Belgians govern after methods which are not in accordance with European custom, and in defiance of the rules of humanity, and that it should be the duty of civilized nations to put an end to what is no less than a disgrace. of Icing Leopold 11. as politically binding, and would probably be ready enough actively to intervene as soon as we and 1;rance came to an understanding in the matter.
An European Conference has already by a resolution come to the opinion that the rule of Belgiuni in Central Africa may one day cease, and that in the event of any change the riglit of purchase has been ceded to France. But none the less, intervention in the form of anything like division of territory would be a ticklish matter. It seems true enough that the Belgians deserve blame for many evil doings, but intervention or dispossession on the ground of such charges would in theory be hazardous, and in practice difficult to carry through. Certainly under no circumstances could we take the initiative in such a matter. But were a crisis actually to arise without any seeking of ours, here would we find one of those territories to which Englishmen would probably be ready to relegate us, France waiving her right of purchase.
Rather different from the case of the Belgian Congo State is that of the Portuguese possessions. Here, unquestionably, the Portuguese have neither the commercial nor the mental energy to deveIop the territories remaining to them from the days of their greatness, as the international commerce of to-day requires. I-Iere are natural resources lying fallow, as to whicli one'is morally justified in demanding that they should be developed for the good of the world in general; and although force must not be here employed, it is still by no means improbable that the Portuguese Republic might be ready to resign her sovereign rights for an adequate monetary equivalent. The Anglo-German Agreement has presumably laid down that, in the event of any division, the East African territories, AIozambique and Lorenzo hlarques should fall to England, the West African, Angola with the estuary of the Congo and Icabinda, to us, T h e claim might now perhaps be put forward that, should England and Russia divide Persia .between them, and thus estend their dominions, the balance might be redressed by England relinquishing any future claim on Portuguese East Africa in our favour, so that we may then estend our own East Africa.
Certainly the disturbances in Persia seem to offer us certain compensation rights, but as it is our East African possessions are already so inconveniently placed in regard to the English, that it would be hopeless to demand any expansion in this direction. The ground plan of any agreement in Africa must be biozambique and Lorenzo Marques with Delagoa Bay to England, Angola with Icabinda to us; at the most the English might give us Zanzibar. Let us take it that this case may shortly present itself, or even both cases, that the Portuguese possessions as well as the Congo State come to be divided, and we have then the possiBut I raise the point only to set it aside. [OCT., 1912 bility of a self-contained German Colonial Empire, that is to say, should we succeed also in acquiring the remainder of the French Congo lying between the Cameroons and the mouth of the Congo.
THE AIMS OF GERMAN COLOSIAL POLICY
W e are justified in accepting this rearrangement as a fairly certain element in our views of the future. The boundary, as defined in the recently ratified Congo Agreement, is so absurd that even the diplomatists who arranged it look upon it as no more than a provisional one. Public opinion in Germany, disgusted with the result of the whole diplomatic campaign, detected here a mistake; I myself saw from the outset a n advantage.
By the creation of the present Congo boundary, the need for its revision at an early date .was also created, i.e., future acquirement by Germany of the whole of the French Congo.
This French Congo is certainly not of any particular value ; it is even distasteful to the German people by reason of the agitation of last autumn. But the geographical union would be of such importance that we ought to strive to bring it about. What have we to offer the French for i t ? In the negotiations of the year before last there was incidentally a talk of exchangi n g for it our colony of Togoland. Public opinion was greatly opposed to this, but when it is considered how estraordinarily low is the national value of-a colony which, although commercially flourishing, cannot, being an eizcImc, expand any further, one cannot altogether refuse all idea of such an eschange. The French Congo, possibly including also the right of purchase of the Belgian Congo, might be had for concessions in regard to our remaining rights in hlarocco and for Togoland.
But even were the Congo State to continue to exist as such, a very vast, as well as a compact German-African Empire would be won by the amalgamation of the Cameroons, the French Congo, Angola and South West Africa. Such a n Empire mould possess the advantage of not being too far distant from Germany, while in the Upper Cameroons and in Southern Angola there are places where German merchants, agents, planters and officials not only actually live, but where a German race can establish itself in the soil.
I-Iere there is a .good climate and sufficient water for intensive agriculture ; the introduction of enough capital and industry would permit its development into a white-man's colony, which would very soon connect itself southwards with our present " South-West " and its intensive husbandry, and in the north with the tropical plantation colonies and the aboriginal agricultural methods under European control. This Empire would become very much larger and more compact with the addition of the Belgian Congo-with the exception of the south-easterly portion, ICatanga, to which England would probably lay claim. By the acquirement of It is impossible to get all one wants at once. these territories our East and +\Vest African possessions would be 1inI;ed together; we should rule from ocean to ocean and would govern a huge Central African Empire.
IVhat prospect hare we of any such development, even if no more than a gradual one? Although by acquiring Mozambique, Lorenzo Marques, Delagoa Bay and Katanga England. would obtain a very large and advantageous estension of her dominions, while there is also the prospect of similar espansion in Persia; still our position from sea to sea would be for England so uncomfortable a n innovation, that she ivould probably rather renounce all her own advantages than \\.orli with us for such an end. It cannot be doubted that, since the fear of almost certain mar during last summer, England is honestly ready to accord us a large and good place in tlie sun, but her own one great object is the establislinient of a communication from Egypt to the Cape. W i l l she be inclined herself to strangle this plan in order to assist us to found a German dominion right across Africa ? This at any rate from niy point of view would be the strongest proof imaginable that England recognized u s as having equal colonial rights with herself.
Do the English perhaps imagine that we might be inclined to sell them Samoa? It is of no great practical value for us, but it is for England. Or are they thinking of an exchange in Africa itself?
But the one thing that chiefly stands i n the way of their plans for the future, is our German East 4frica.
We have already raised the consideration that Togoland might have to be given up in order that our western possessions might be geographically rounded off ; but supposing Germany were to retain Togoland and relinquish East Africa in its place? England still possesses many places in West Africa which would admirably " round off '' the German belongings in those parts, and which could be offered in eschange for East Africa. On the IVest Xfrican coast England holds the Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast (Ashanti), and Xorthern and Southern Nigeria-the valley of the Niger and Renue and the town of T,agos. Were England to resign all these possessions, France could then acquire from her the Gambia, Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast, thus cspanding and rounding her North West African Dominion in a most advantageous manner, handing over for these to Germany Dahomey (between Togoland and Nigeria) as well as the Congo and the right of purchase of the Belgian Congo; Germany would obtain Nigeria and would thus come into possession of an African Empire, stretching minter:
ruptedly to Cape Colony in the south and to the Gold Coast in the north. The population of Nigeria is computed at not less than r j nil lion souls; the territory suggested to be handed over to France at four and a half millions ; German East Africa has no more than ten millions. England would thus give up OCT** 19121 THE AIMS OF GERMAN COLOSIAL POLICY more than she would receive in return, but she would gain tlie uninterrupted stretch of her East .African Dominion from Cairo to the Cape.
Could Germany accept this as a basis ior negotiation, if the adherence of Lord Haldane to such propositions could be secured? Is it not our duty to aeclare beforehand that such is unacceptable so far as we are concerned?
The material gain would be considerable. Nigeria is much larger and far more thiclily populated than is German East Africa. IVe should retain Togoland, should obtain Dahoniey, and s o join Togoland on to the Cameroons. IVhile it is a matter of doubt whether the French would regard Togoland as an equivalent for their Congo, the three possessions given up by England should make this good, and permit us to acquire the \diole huge Hinterland up to the 14th degree of latitude, and by means of rearrangements i n Siarocco to indemnify Spain for giving up Fernando Po and Rio JIuni. But in the event of the French still not finding this satisfactory, England could vet give up something in some other portion of the world. East Africa is very disadvantageously placed for a German colony; the voyage thither by way of the blediterranean and the Suez Canal lasts five weeks, to Nigeria only a fortnight. It \kould take too long, and I do not feel myself qualified, to enter upon a comparison of the internal advantages of the two countries, of which the one lies just so much to the north of the equator as the other lies to the south of it; the main question is this-is it morally possible for us to acquiesce in an exchange, in a giving away of a territory which is already colonized by a fairly large number of Germans, something like two thousand ? It would be difficult enough in the case of Togoland, but can it be considered in the case of East Africa, which is eleven times as large, and where not only are there a large number ot German men of business, but a few hundred farmers and planters, and where no sniall amount of German blood has been shed in the hoisting over it of the German flag?
We are again, and from another side, confronted by the truth of the saying that it is not its commercial, but its national value, which determines the importance of a colony. Were they no more than large properties, one could always look upon an eschange as merely a commercial transaction. But all these countries contain cemeteries which are not to be lightly handed over.
In every village church in England are to be found memorial tablets to the sons of the leading families in the land, who have given their lives for that Greater Britain all the world over ; and so for the French too it would be very difficult to give up the Congo-not so much on account of the commercial value of the country, which is after all nothing very great, but by reason of the French blood which has there been shed and has left something of Fame behind it. I would leave it to each of niy readers to form his own opinion and decide for himself.
It is not even known whether the English are making such an offer, or whether changes are not making themselves felt in the international situation which may render any decision unnecessary, or which may produce altogether different conditions. I would only insist upon the following points :-First, that national and not commercial interests must decide the question, n o t that commercial interests should be separated from national, but that they should be subordinate as the means is to the end.
Secondly, that the aim of our colonial aspirations must be a vast, compact territory, wherein the German spirit can rule by its own strength.
Thirdly, that should it only be possible to obtain such a territory by exchange, then it' is desirable to bring the matter speedily to settlement, since the longer it is delayed the more difficult it becomes to give up a territory which has once been colonized by Germans.
Fourthly, that we should not hesitate about the amount of the purchase money, if the first and greatest of acquisitionsPortuguese Angola-is in the market.
Fifthly, that the striking of a colonial balance between Germany and England mould in large measure ensure the peace of the world for a long time to come, and that consequently such a consummation should be striven for by putting forth d l energy and every honest endeavour. a
